The Death of Diplomatic Possibility: How the Death of FDR Exacerbated and Solidified the Cold War Page 2
True to his word, the United States began a chilling of the negotiations with the Soviet Union under the untried Truman. Instead of trying to cooperate with his former ally, Truman determined that the Western democracies needed to lay down the law with the Soviets. Supported by unparalleled economic might and a monopoly of nuclear energy, Truman “‘…wanted to show who was boss,’” as Molotov recalled in his later years.11 Where Roosevelt compromised to achieve peace and progress for the benefit of the world as illustrated at Yalta, Truman combatted Soviet desires and actions with force in the interest of the United States, and it began at the Potsdam conference. Truman informed Stalin of the successful demonstration of the atomic bomb at the conference, but he did so in a rather vague, unfriendly manner—as if he was using the bomb as a bargaining chip for future negotiation.12 Following the descending of the “iron curtain” in Eastern Europe as Winston Churchill declared, the Western democracies viewed the encroachment of the Soviet Union as a threat to not only the West, but the freedom of the countries endangered by communism. Truman retaliated with his doctrine to contain the creeping of communism through unanimous support of the self-declaration of any country around the globe in 1947. One year later, Secretary of State George C. Marshall introduced his own plan to carry out the Truman Doctrine rhetoric, and the two strategies combined to solidify an American police presence in the postwar world. Consequently, the United States contributed trillions of dollars in aid to rebuild nations far from American shores and deploy American soldiers to countries distant from real American interests out of trite communist paranoia. The United States sent troops to Korea in 1950 following a communist North Korean advance, and gradually increased the supply of arms, money, and advisory into Vietnam before conducting full-fledged combat operations in 1965, with harrowing results.
Possibly the sharpest, most alarming contrast in Roosevelt and Truman’s policies in Cold War relations was regarding atomic energy—as Truman used the bomb as leverage in handling communist aggression. Many historians argue that the use of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final days of World War II were explosive demonstrations and vivid messages to the Soviet Union about the power of the United States. The paranoia and disgust of Americans towards communism trickled down from the presidency into other reaches of government as well, as United States Senator Edwin Johnson believed “God had placed the atomic bomb in U.S. hands as a trust to enable America to lead the world to peace,” and to use the bomb to “‘compel mankind to adopt a policy of lasting peace or be burnt to a crisp.’”13 Johnson’s rhetoric foreshadowed the staunch anti-communist and religious conservatives who believed it was a divine mission for the United States to contain and liberate the world from communism. With Roosevelt, however, the monopoly of nuclear energy that Truman instituted may have been more open and unrestricted to American control, as Roosevelt was planning on discussing the bomb with the Soviets just before he died. Unfortunately, Roosevelt did not live to educate the Soviets about atomic development, and the extreme nature of the American credo in Cold War policy created mutual hostility and brinksmanship in the ensuing decades. The United States and Soviet Union both placed military buildup, technological advancement, and nuclear development at the forefront of foreign and domestic policy, signified by the drafting of National Security Council Report 68 and the creation of NASA. The most terrifying example of Cold War escalation and intervention culminated with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the United States and Soviet Union were eerily close to nuclear confrontation. Without the patience of Roosevelt in the mushrooming issue of nuclear energy, the newfound hostility under Truman created the atmosphere for a standoff between the Cold War leaders focused on armament.
From Woodrow Wilson in 1917 to George Bush in 2003, the United States has striven to be the world’s beacon of liberty, freedom, and hope, and its principal defender of democracy. It has intervened in countries as minute as Grenada in the Caribbean, and as far away as Vietnam in the heart of Southeast Asia. It has spent immeasurable amounts of money, gifted boundless amounts of supplies and aid, and sacrificed tens of thousands of lives of American men and women in the name of democracy. Yet few of these acts of American intervention provided the receivers with much benefit at all. The lush jungles of Southeast Asia were scorched and cleared with napalm and Agent Orange; the urban centers of North Vietnam were relentlessly bombed into submission. Thousands in Nicaragua were tortured, raped, and executed behind the military support of the United States under Ronald Reagan. Each of these interventions were American efforts to thwart the growth of communism, no matter where in the world and no matter what the price. They were justified by the Western democratic dogma that any country should have the autonomy to govern themselves and the freedom of self-declaration, but the leaders who hoped to provide foreign nations with unbound liberty were depriving those people of what they declared themselves. Vietnam was a country dependent on its communal agrarian society, which suited communism well. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, who the United States strongly desired be removed from power, were elected democratically. These acts of aggression, even when the immoralities were obvious, were all products of the paralyzing actions of Cold War leaders in the months following World War II.
It is impossible to surmise with any degree of certainty whether the Cold War would have ever been waged had Roosevelt been able to direct more of the postwar planning and diplomacy in the pivotal years of the late 1940s. However, It is without question that the fanatic militancy and hostility of the Cold War would have been curtailed and replaced with more cooperation and openness between the United States and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt essentially killed himself through an unmatched determination to compromise with the Soviets and Joseph Stalin if they could not agree on plans for the future. He conceded the heavily sought-after freedoms of Eastern Europe to the Soviets in exchange for Stalin’s satisfaction as well as American gain. However, through his own egomania and self-denial, Roosevelt jeopardized the ability of his government to prepare for a world without war by not coming to grips with his deteriorating health. Furthermore, Roosevelt’s private agreements with Stalin and his failure to provide his successors with much to build upon allowed for the Soviet leader to capitalize on the changes of power in acquiring his own interests in Eastern Europe, giving Harry Truman the justification for an inflexible, hostile,
and militant posture toward the Soviet Union. The result was nearly a half-century of a global political dichotomy and a viselike grip of conservatism in domestic America. Endorsed by Truman, the United States government enacted the Loyalty Boards, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and allowed for madmen conspirators like Senator Joseph McCarthy to strike fear in the American people tarnish the legitimacy of government. Globally, the democratic free world stood opposite the Red communists ready at an instant to send method, men, and materiel to any place, at any time, and at any price to halt the advance of their opponent’s influence. A chilling polarization—hardened by the threat of nuclear power—which produced an atmosphere of fear, tension, and worldwide discontent, simply out of the failure of leaders of the United States to carry on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s diplomatic ambitions.
Bibliography
Ferrell, Robert H. Harry S. Truman: A Life. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1994. p.